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OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Gunnar Steward sued his employer, Sears, Roebuck & Co., for terminating him in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 261 et seq. 
Steward appeals the District Court’s order granting judgment as a matter of law in favor
of Sears and, in the alternative, granting Sears’ motion for a new trial.  We will reverse.
I.
Although the parties are familiar with the record, we review it nonetheless because
the presence of certain facts and evidence in the record is crucial to our review, given the
nature of the motions before the District Court.  
Steward began working at Sears as a Level I Technician in March 1979.  After a
series of gradual promotions, he obtained the position of Technical Manager in Sears’
Wilmington facility in December 1998.  In this capacity, Steward was required to support,
organize, direct, coach, and develop the technical work force to provide service to
customers at home or in the Sears service unit.  Steward was terminated on July 2, 2001,
at the age of 50.  At the time of Steward’s termination, there was one other Technical
Manager located in the Wilmington facility: Tony Carter, age 45.  Joyce Sipple, age 60,
was a Technical Manager at the Dover facility and Brian Merkel, age 35, was a Technical
Manager at the Reading facility.  Mark DeWit, age 33, was a manager at the Wilmington
    1Steward argues that the jury could have reasonably concluded that DeWit was
promoted to Technical Manager on July 1, 2001 based on Sears’ computer printouts.  The
printouts provide information about DeWit’s Employee Review.  The “From/To Date” on
the report is 7/01/2001 to 7/20/2002 and the Review Date is 1/31/2003.  The Job Code for
DeWit is “Technical Manager.”  App. 1865.  Another printout detailing an Employee
Review for DeWit is for a “From/To Date”of 1/01/2001 to 12/31/2001 and the Review
Date is 2/18/2002.  The Job Code is again “Technical Manager.”  App. 1864.  DeWit
testified that he did not know why the report would indicate that he was a Technical
Manager from 2001 to 2002.
    2 A score of “4” means “consistently exceeds expectations,” “3” means “consistently
meets expectations,” and “2” means “some expectations met.” App. 1818.
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facility in early 2001 and was given the position of Technical Manager on or after July 1,
2001.1  
At trial, Steward presented his employment record, with his job titles and salaries
listed, as well as several certificates of achievement for completion of various courses and
programs.  Steward also presented his 1999 performance review, completed by the then-
District Service Manager, Roy Vasseur.  Steward received a “4” (out of 5) in both
Business Results and Leadership in this review.2  Steward also received a rating of “4” in
Customer Total Repair Index, Associate Total Repair Index, Building Relationships,
Customer Satisfaction, and in completion of repairs on the first try.  Mr. Vasseur testified
that Steward was at “above expectations” for leadership at the end of 1999.  App. 1199. 
Following this review, Steward received a merit increase in his salary and a bonus in
March 2000.  He received another salary increase in June 2000.  Prior to Vasseur’s
departure in August 2000, he again reviewed Steward.  He rated Steward a “4” in
Customer Satisfaction, Building Relationships, and Teamwork, and a “3” in all other
4categories.  Steward also introduced the Sears productivity report for 2000, which showed
that Steward’s technicians handled the largest number of calls. 
Carter and Merkel both testified about their impressions of Steward’s performance. 
Carter testified, concerning Steward’s production, that “I would say it was very high. 
I think he’s an excellent motivator.  A lot of people liked him that came to me afterwards,
because a lot of the shop technicians knew me prior to him getting there and ... then they
came to me and said, you know what, he’s like you, he cares about us.  And it made me
feel good to hear somebody say that about him, because we worked together as a team.” 
App. 1298.  Carter also testified, concerning Steward’s interaction with customers:
“I thought he did a great job with customers, if I had to say so myself, I think he did a
great job with them.”  App. 1299.  Merkel testified that he found Steward acceptable,
agreeable and responsive.  He agreed that Steward gave him what he needed and
responded to him when he needed it. 
In mid-December 2000, Phillip Schweizer, then age 33, became the District
Service Manager at the Wilmington facility.  Schweizer supervised Steward, Carter,
Merkel, DeWit and Sipple.  Steward testified that, from the beginning, Schweizer treated
him differently than the other Technical Managers.  Steward testified that Schweizer
“wasn’t very cordial when we first started interacting the first couple of weeks.”  App.
431.  In his relations with the other Technical Managers, Schweizer “appeared to be much
friendlier, more – or just more casual, conversation, things like that.”  Id.  When
Schweizer brought his wife to the facility, he introduced her to a younger manager and to
    3Schweizer testified that he gave Steward the PPI in March.  Steward testified that
Schweizer briefly showed him the PPI at the February meeting, but that he did not receive
a copy until late February or March.  As the District Court noted, the report is dated 21
February, 2000, but both sides agree that the record was completed in 2001.  The
signatures of Steward and Schweizer on the report are dated “2/3/01,” but the report
discusses events that occurred on February 7, 2001.  App. 1827-28. 
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other people at the facility, but not to Steward.  Schweizer also directed Carter to move
the office shared by Carter and Steward without telling Steward. 
Prior to February 2001, Steward had never been warned, reprimanded or counseled
by Sears.  In February 2001, a couple months after Schweizer became the District Service
Manager, Schweizer gave Steward a performance review for the year 2000.  In the
performance review, Steward was scored a “3” in Business Results, Customer
Satisfaction and Ownership, and a “2” in Leadership.  App. 1818.   For this same period,
Carter and Merkel both also received a “3” in Business Results and a “2” in Leadership. 
Sipple received a “3” in both categories.  DeWit received scores of “4” in both Business
Results and Leadership.
Steward testified that Schweizer met with Steward and informed Steward that he
would receive no bonus for 2000.  He also gave Steward a “performance plan for
improvement” or PPI.3  Prior to issuing the PPI, Schweizer did not give Steward a
counseling memorandum, as recommended by the Sears PPI policy.  The PPI provided a
detailed description of Steward’s “performance issues”: 
-The established procedure for a Multiple Attempt to repair
an in home item is to involve the Lead Tech/Tech Manager on
the Recall.  
6-On the RMDS Multiple Attempt report it is clear that the
same technicians often go out on the same call three and
more times without input from the Tech Manager.
-It is often required that the Tech Manager call customers to
resolve discrepancies with the service rendered or the cost of
the service.
- With Customer Montana Gunnar had to be repeatedly
informed by the Parts Manager, Parts Pro, Customer
Relations Supervisor, and myself before he called the
customer. This customer specifically asked to talk to the
technicians [sic] manager and Gunnar did not reply as he
was “gathering the facts”.
-There is a weekly GAP meeting where all tech managers are
required to bring the following information: the previous
weeks actual calls, planned calls, actual hours, planned
hours, and training hours by industry.
- Gunnar has failed to bring this information to the past 5
meetings. Additionally, he has depended on the excellent
work ethics of other tech managers to accomplish this for
him.
-Gunnar consistently fails to meet deadlines.  He was tasked
with providing his vacation numbers at the time of the DSM
meeting in Gaithersburg.  He did not provide those numbers
until 7 Feb 01.  Additionally, he depended on other tech
managers to input the data for him.
- Your performance would be greatly improved by
adherence to accepted Sear's business standards and
established processes.
App. 1827.  Steward testified that the meeting lasted less than five minutes and that he
was shocked and upset by what had occurred.  During the meeting, Schweizer did not
give Steward a copy of the PPI or show him any Sears records supporting Schweizer’s
criticisms of Steward’s performance.  Steward wrote on the PPI comments section that “I
feel it unfair to be rated for a years performance by someone who has been here for a
month.”  App. 1828.  In March 2001, Steward received a salary raise and a bonus. 
7After Steward received the PPI, he participated in a process called the Parts
Distribution Center Sweep (the “PDC Sweep”) at the Wilmington facility.  This was the
first PDC Sweep that Sears had conducted.  In this process, the parts stored in a facility’s
inventory would be reduced, with unnecessary parts being removed, or swept, from the
facility's inventory.  Prior to the PDC Sweep, Steward and the other Technical Managers
attended a planning meeting.  Steward testified that he never received any written
directives from Sears concerning how to conduct the PDC Sweep.  Steward testified that
a PDC representative named Mr. Howell told him to remove various parts and that
replacement parts would arrive the next morning.  The replacement parts did not arrive
the next morning.  Steward had removed parts from the Wilmington facility that were
needed immediately to service customers’ lawn mowers, and so he attempted to get more
lawn mower parts from another facility.  He was, however, unsuccessful.  Sears presented
evidence at trial that Sipple and Merkel were responsible for the PDC Sweeps in their
facilities in Dover and Reading, respectively, and removed only surplus parts from their
facilities in the PDC Sweep, and retained the parts necessary to run their facilities.  
The required follow-up meeting about Steward’s PPI did not occur until April 26,
2001, even though Sears’ policy recommends that the PPI follow-up meeting take place
30 days after the initial meeting.  At the follow-up meeting, Schweizer placed Steward on
a new PPI.  Steward testified that Schweizer called Steward into his office, handed
Steward the PPI, informed Steward that he had to leave to go to a meeting, and left. 
Steward sarcastically replied “Is that it?,” because he was shocked that he was receiving
    4The District Court found that Steward finished the meeting by saying “Is that it?” 
However, according to Steward, Schweizer ended the meeting by announcing that he had
to leave.  Steward then said “‘Is that it,’ very sarcastically because I couldn’t believe that
I was getting another PPI and he wouldn’t even discuss it.”  App. 486.
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another PPI.4  Steward testified that Schweizer did not show him any documents or
records related to customer complaints at this meeting.
The new PPI identified four additional customers with whom plaintiff failed to
follow-up properly: customers Stagg, Givens, Rodel, and Gaglia.  The PPI also noted that
Steward “[f]ailed to manage shop personnel to maximize productivity” and “[f]ailed to
get involved with PDC Process when [he was] identified as one of the leaders.”  App.
2496. 
At trial, Steward presented a copy of the customer service order for customer
Stagg, on which Steward had noted that as of April 14, 2001, the customer was satisfied
with the service.  He testified that customer Givens was handled in the normal way and
that there was nothing unusual about the service order.  Customer Gaglia was upset that a
technician that came to his home was rude and called Steward.  Steward testified that he
called the customer back and left a message saying that he would address the issue with
the technician.  The customer was angry that Steward did not apologize for the
technician’s rudeness in his voicemail.  Steward testified that the customer’s appliance
was taken care of and serviced properly, and that he spoke to the technician, who
explained that the customer had wanted him to do additional repairs on the appliance
without payment.
9In his testimony, Steward noted that there were only four complaining customers
identified out of the 17,000 customers that his technicians had serviced that year.  He also
presented a productivity report for 2000, which showed that 88% of the time Steward’s
technicians performed and completed the required service within a week.  According to
this report, Steward had the highest rating in this area out of all of the Technical
Managers.  He also presented evidence that his technicians completed service on the first
attempt 80.5% of the time, while Merkel’s technicians did so 78.7% of the time.
After the PPI follow-up meeting, Schweizer transferred responsibility for the
maintenance of “road technician trucks” from the “truck stock specialist” to the Technical
Managers.  When Steward complained to Schweizer about the additional responsibility,
Schweizer told him, “Hell, you are old enough, you have been around long enough, you
should handle this.”  App. 519.
Schweizer met with Steward again on May 29, 2001 to discuss the PPI.  At this
meeting, Schweizer identified several other outstanding problems, including: (1) “freon
and OSHA compliance in shops;” (2) “ready times among HA/HE techs;” and (3) “follow
through with customers.”  App. 2499.  In the performance plan section, Steward was
instructed to return customer phone calls within the business day that the message was
received.  In addition, Steward was told that the shop must be managed so that orders are
ready on the date that the shop promised the customer.  In addition, Steward was
instructed that the same technician should not go out on the same call three and more
times without Steward’s intervention.  Finally, he was ordered to identify and organize all
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of the merchandise in the outside storage area for tractors by the end of the day on June 4,
2001. 
On May 30, 2001, Steward emailed Schweizer that “I’m not sure whether I’ll be
able to make the June 4 deadline.”  App. 2950.  Schweizer replied that “[t]he June 4
deadline is a hard deadline and I expect it to be met.”  App. 2951.  Steward failed to
clean-up the tractor yard by the June 4 deadline.
Steward was terminated on July 2, 2001.  The notice of termination, dated June 27,
2001, explained that Steward was terminated because he “demonstrated a lack of
ownership of the responsibilities of a Technical Manager at Sears Product Repair
Services.”  App. 1844.  Schweizer listed the following three behaviors as leading to
plaintiff's termination:
1. Although Mr. Steward has increased his contact with customers,
the level of service provided is not at a level commiserate [sic] with
his position.
2. Mr. Steward's failure to satisfy customers is demonstrated in 
missed promise dates in the shop. This is a direct result of Mr. 
Steward's failure to take ownership of the shop workload.
3. In following through on the last review, dated 5-31-2001, there
were specific responsibilities outlined to Mr. Steward. Mr. Steward
was to ensure that the outside storage area for the Lawn and Garden
Shop was cleaned, organized and all equipment identified by 6-4-
2001. Mr. Steward failed to meet the agreed upon deadline and
further more [sic] failed to keep me informed or request an extended
deadline.
App. 1844.
In December 2002, Steward sued Sears for terminating his employment in
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violation of the ADEA.  The case was tried before a jury from September 7 through
September 19, 2005.  Magistrate Judge Rueter presided.  The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Steward on September 20 and awarded back pay and front pay.  The jury found
in favor of Sears on the question of whether the discrimination was willful, and awarded
no liquidated damages.  
Sears then moved pursuant to Rule 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law or, in the
alternative, for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(1), and for remittitur.  Sears argued that
Steward failed to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination and that, even if Steward
established a prima facie case, the evidence of intentional discrimination was insufficient
for the jury to return a verdict for Steward.  Specifically, Sears argued that Steward failed
to prove the fourth element of his prima facie case and that, based on the evidence
presented, no reasonable jury could conclude that age was a determinative factor in
Steward’s termination.  In addition, Sears urged that, even if Steward proved his prima
facie case and presented evidence that cast doubt on Sears’ stated reasons for the
termination, the jury was not entitled to infer discriminatory intent from this evidence. 
Sears also contended that errors in the jury instructions and misconduct by Steward’s
counsel rendered the trial unfair and that a new trial was required.  Sears added that the
damage award was contrary to the law and to the evidence presented at trial.
The District Court granted Sears’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and
entered judgment in favor of Sears.  The Court concluded that Steward failed to prove the
fourth element of his prima facie case because he failed to prove that his coworkers who
12
assumed his job duties were “sufficiently younger” than Steward, or that other, “similarly
situated” employees were treated more favorably.   Steward v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No.
02-8921, 2006 WL 1648979, at *12 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2006).  The Court further found
that Steward failed to present sufficient evidence to show that Sears’ stated reasons for
terminating Steward were pretextual.  The Court also ruled on Sears’ motion for a new
trial, as is required by Rule 50(c)(1), and granted the motion on the ground that the
verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence.  Id. at *29.  The Court rejected
Sears’ other arguments for granting a new trial, including “misconduct” by Steward’s
counsel and an allegedly erroneous jury instruction.  Sears’ motion for remittitur was
denied.
Steward appeals the District Court’s order granting judgment as a matter of law in
favor of Sears and granting Sears’ motion for a new trial.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
We have jurisdiction over Steward’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We exercise plenary review over an order granting a motion for judgment as a
matter of law and apply the same standard as the district court.  Lightning Lube, Inc. v.
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).  “Such a motion should be granted only if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the
advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from
which a jury reasonably could find liability.  In determining whether the evidence is
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sufficient to sustain liability, the court may not weigh the evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or substitute its version of the facts for the jury’s version.”  Id.
(internal citations omitted).  Applying the same standard used by the District Court, we
must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” and we “may not
make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).  In reviewing the record as a whole, we must
“disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to
believe” and “give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that
evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to
the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.”  Id. at 151 (internal
quotations omitted).
“We review the district court’s order ruling on a motion for a new trial for abuse of
discretion unless the court’s denial is based on the application of a legal precept, in which
case the standard of review is plenary.”  Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1167.
A.  Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 
If there is no direct evidence of age discrimination, as in this case, a plaintiff may
prove age discrimination through the use of circumstantial evidence.  In order to establish
a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show that he: “(1) is over 40; (2)
is qualified for the position in question; (3) suffered an adverse employment decision; and
(4) was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to permit an inference of age
discrimination.”  Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir.
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1995).  If the plaintiff establishes these four elements, this creates a presumption of age
discrimination, which the employer can rebut by providing a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.  Id.  If the employer has
met its burden to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual.  The
plaintiff must present evidence “direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could
reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reason; or (2)
believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or
determinative cause of the employer's action.  The factfinder may infer from the
combination of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, as well as its own rejection of the
employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason, that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against the plaintiff and was merely trying to conceal its illegal act with the
articulated reason.”  Id. at 331 (internal citation omitted).  
In this case, the parties did not dispute that Steward had proved the first three
elements of his prima facie case.  Accordingly, the members of the jury were instructed
that they only had to determine whether Steward proved the fourth element of his prima
facie case: that “someone substantially younger assumed plaintiff’s duties or was treated
more favorably.”  App. 1746.  If so, then they were to move on to consider Sear’s stated
non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Steward and whether plaintiff proved that the
stated reasons were pretextual.  Id. at 1747-48.  The District Court granted Sears’ motion
for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that Steward failed to establish a prima
15
facie case of age discrimination and, even if he had established a prima facie case, he
failed to present sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that Sears’ stated
nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination were pretextual.     
1.  Sufficient Evidence to Raise Inference of Discriminatory Intent
After a jury verdict has been rendered, we do not review whether the plaintiff
introduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  See
Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Where the defendant has
done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had made out a prima facie
case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant.” (quoting U.S. Postal
Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)).   Rather, we consider
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s ultimate conclusion that age was
a determinative factor in Steward’s termination.  Id.  However, our inquiry into whether
the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict does not differ markedly from first
inquiring into whether the plaintiff submitted evidence sufficient to establish the elements
of a prima facie case and then into whether he sustained his burden of proving that his
employer’s reasons were a mere pretext.  See id. at 764 n.2 (“Although we do not address
this contention in terms of the prima facie case, it may be that our inquiry into the
sufficiency of the evidence to support . . . an inference [of discrimination] will not differ
markedly from an inquiry into whether the plaintiff has introduced evidence sufficient to
establish one of the elements essential to her prima facie case.” (citations omitted)).
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The District Court concluded that Steward failed to establish the fourth element of
a prima facie case of age discrimination and that, therefore, the evidence presented could
not support the jury’s ultimate conclusion that Sears’ decision to terminate Steward was
discriminatory.  See id. at 764.  The Court considered the sufficiency of Steward’s
evidence to establish the fourth element of his claim, namely, that “someone sufficiently
younger assumed his duties or was treated more favorably so as to create an inference of
age discrimination.”  Steward, 2006 WL 1648979, at *12.  The Court concluded that the
jury could find that Steward’s duties were assumed by the three remaining Technical
Managers, Carter (45), Merkel (35) and Sipple (60), with some assistance from DeWit
(33).  Id. at *14.  The average age of these four comparators at the time Steward was
terminated was 43.25 years old, or 6.75 years younger than Steward.  The Court
concluded that the 6.75 year average age difference between Steward and the comparators
was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because the
comparators were not “sufficiently younger” than Steward to permit an inference of
discrimination.  Id. at *15. 
None of our prior decisions squarely address whether a 6.75 year average age
difference between a plaintiff and those who assume his job duties is sufficiently large to
give rise to an inference of age discrimination. See Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d
694, 699 (3d Cir. 1995) (eight year difference between plaintiff and comparator could
support a finding that the comparator was “sufficiently younger” than the plaintiff to
permit an inference of age discrimination); Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724,
17
729-30 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that the combined difference in age between plaintiff
and four-years-younger and ten-years-younger coworkers was clearly sufficient to satisfy
the fourth prong of a prima facie case by raising an inference of age discrimination).  But
see Narin v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 323, 333 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that
plaintiff could not succeed because she failed to proffer evidence that the employer’s
stated reasons were pretextual and adding in a footnote that plaintiff also failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination because replacement employees, aged 49
and 54, were not sufficiently younger than 56-year-old plaintiff to permit an inference of
discrimination); Bernard v. Beth Energy Mines, 837 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(concluding that neither applicant hired for the position at issue, who were 47 years old
and 50 years 6 months old respectively, were significantly younger than plaintiff, who
was 54), aff’d without opinion, 31 F.3d 1170 (3d Cir. 1994).  
We decline to adopt a brightline rule that a 6.75 year average age difference
between a plaintiff and those who assume his job duties is, as a matter of law, insufficient
to give rise to an inference of age discrimination.  Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Steward, we must consider not only the average age of those who assumed
Steward’s job duties, but also the age of each individual coworker who took over some
portion of Steward’s duties, as well as what portion of Steward’s duties each assumed. 
Here, two of the Sears employees who assumed Steward’s job duties – DeWit (33) and
Merkel (35) – were each fifteen or more years younger than Steward.  Moreover, DeWit
was working in the same location as Steward at the time of Steward’s termination and
    5Since we find that this evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination, we need not also consider whether the evidence that other similarly
situated employees, who were significantly younger than Steward were treated more
favorably than Steward, was also sufficient to establish the fourth element of Steward’s
prima facie case.  
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ultimately assumed the title of Technical Manager at the Wilmington facility. 
Furthermore, DeWit, as well as Carter, took over the supervision of some of the
technicians that Steward used to supervise after Steward was terminated.  Of those who
assumed Steward’s job duties, only Sipple (60) was older than Steward, and she did not
work at the same facility as Steward, nor did either side offer any evidence as to which of
Steward’s duties Sipple assumed.  The jury could have inferred from the evidence
presented that DeWit and Carter, who were located in Wilmington and who both testified
to taking over supervision of some of Steward’s technicians, assumed a greater portion of
Steward’s duties than Merkel and Sipple, who were located in Reading and Dover.  The
jury could have viewed DeWit and Carter as the primary replacements for Steward, and
could have placed greater weight on the evidence of the age difference between Steward
and DeWit and between Steward and Carter than on the average age difference between
Steward and the four replacements.  Thus, the District Court erred in deciding whether to
overturn the jury’s verdict by categorically measuring the age difference between Steward
and his replacements as 6.75 years.  We conclude that, based on all the evidence, the jury
could have found that Steward established the fourth element of a prima facie case of age
discrimination.5  
19
However, Sears also presented evidence that its decision to terminate Steward was
based on nondiscriminatory reasons.  We must therefore consider whether the evidence
presented by Steward was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to disbelieve Sears’ stated
nondiscriminatory reasons for Steward’s termination, or otherwise believe that an
invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative
cause of Sears’ action. 
2.  Evidence that the Stated Reasons Are Pretextual
Sears presented evidence that it terminated Steward’s employment for three
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons: Steward’s failure to timely complete assigned
tasks, his failure to respond to customer complaints, and his failure to be properly
involved in “multiple repair attempts.”  Steward had the burden to present sufficient
evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably either disbelieve the employer’s
articulated legitimate reason or believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more
likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action.  Brewer, 72
F.3d at 331.  Steward had to show that the employer’s stated reasons were not merely
wrong or mistaken, but rather he had to “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of
credence,’ and hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-
discriminatory reasons.’”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994).  
When the employer relies on particular criticisms as a reason for the adverse
20
action, “the issue is not whether the [] criticisms of [the plaintiff] were substantiated or
valid . . . .  [T]he question is whether [the employer] believed those criticisms to be
accurate and actually relied upon them.”  Id. at 766-67.  “Pretext is not established by
virtue of the fact that an employee has received some favorable comments in some
categories or has, in the past, received some good evaluations.”  Ezold v. Wolf, Block,
Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 528 (3d Cir. 1992).  A plaintiff does not establish
pretext by pointing to commendation of the plaintiff in categories the defendant says it
did not rely upon in making the employment decision at issue.  Id. at 531. Rather, the
factfinder must consider the employee’s performance in the categories that the employer
deemed relevant to the employment decision.  See id.  A plaintiff is not required to “cast
doubt on each proffered reason in a vacuum. If the defendant proffers a bagful of
legitimate reasons, and the plaintiff manages to cast substantial doubt on a fair number of
them, the plaintiff may not need to discredit the remainder. That is because the
factfinder’s rejection of some of the defendant's proffered reasons may impede the
employer’s credibility seriously enough so that a factfinder may rationally disbelieve the
remaining proffered reasons, even if no evidence undermining those remaining rationales
in particular is available.”  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 n.7.
We conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Steward, a
jury could reasonably either disbelieve the Sears’ articulated legitimate reasons for
terminating Steward or otherwise believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was
more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of Sears’ action.  Steward
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presented sufficient evidence of the weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in some of Sears’ stated reasons for terminating Steward
that a reasonable factfinder could rationally have found these reasons “unworthy of
credence” and instead concluded that Steward’s age was more likely than not a
motivating or determinative cause of the termination. 
a.  Schweizer’s Remark
In addition to presenting evidence to cast doubt on the three specific reasons given
by Sears for his termination, Steward also presented evidence of Schweizer’s age-based
bias against him.  Steward testified that Schweizer made an age-based comment to him in
May 2001, in response to Steward’s voicing concerns about the additional responsibilities
given to the Technical Managers at that time.  Schweizer said to Steward,  “Hell, you are
old enough, you have been around long enough, you should handle this.”  App. 519.  The
District Court concluded that the comment did not clearly show an age bias.  “The age
comment, rather than exhibiting a bias against plaintiff because of his age, expressed
Schweizer’s opinion that plaintiff could perform the extra work assigned because of his
experience.  Any other inference regarding that statement is unreasonable.”  Steward,
2006 WL 1648979, at *29.
We disagree and conclude that a reasonable factfinder could infer from this remark
that Schweizer was biased against Steward because of his age.  The remark reflects
Schweizer’s awareness of Steward’s age, not merely his “experience” or time with the
company.  The jury could have inferred from this evidence that Schweizer was more
    6 For all we know, the jury may have developed an unfavorable opinion of Schweizer,
who was an important witness for Sears.  We have no way of knowing what his demeanor
on the stand may have been.  The jury may have discredited Schweizer’s testimony and
credited Steward’s.
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impatient with Steward because of Steward’s age and held him to a different standard
than his coworkers because of his age.6  
The District Court also concluded that this remark was not probative of Sears’
motivation in terminating Steward because it was not made in connection with Steward’s
termination.  Id. at *26-27.  However, remarks made by supervisors directly involved in
the termination decision at issue can be evidence of their discriminatory animus, even if
the remarks were not made in connection with the termination decision.  Cf. Ezold v.
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 528 (3d Cir. 1992) (comments by
partner who did not participate in promotion decision, made five years before failure to
promote plaintiff, were not probative).
b. Failure to timely complete assigned tasks
In addition to the evidence of Schweizer’s age-based bias against Steward,
Steward also presented evidence to cast doubt on Sears’s claim that it terminated Steward
because he failed to complete assigned tasks in a timely manner.  Specifically, Steward
failed to clean the tractor yard by June 4 and he failed to submit the vacation records to
Schweizer on time.  Steward does not dispute that he did not complete either of these
tasks by the deadline provided to him.  However, Steward testified that he warned
Schweizer by email in advance of the June 4 deadline that he was concerned that he
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would not complete the yard clean-up by June 4.  He also noted in his comments on the
PPI that “[a]s stated in the e-mail I sent you, I will try to have the tractor yard finished by
the June 4 deadline.  I am short of help.  One tech is off with surgery and the other can’t
work overtime.”  App. 531.  Notably, Schweizer did not mention this “heads up” in
Steward’s termination notice but, to the contrary, stated in the termination notice that
“Steward failed to ... keep me informed or request an extended deadline.”  App. 1844.  As
for the vacation records, Steward testified that Schweizer made no comment to him when
Steward handed him the vacation records in February and did not inform Steward that he
was bothered by the delay in receiving these records until he noted it for the first time in
the initial PPI.  In addition, Steward presented a productivity report for 2000, which
showed that 88% of the time Steward’s technicians performed and completed the required
service within a week.  According to this report, Steward had the highest rating in this
area out of all of the Technical Managers. 
Sears also presented evidence that it terminated Steward because he failed to
address the backlog of lawn mowers waiting to be repaired in Wilmington.  Steward
testified that these repairs could not be completed in a timely manner because of the lack
of the appropriate parts.  Schweizer testified that he was aware of the parts shortage and
that the mowers could not be repaired because of the parts shortage.  Sears argued that the
lack of spare parts was attributable to Steward’s improper handling of the PDC Sweep. 
However, Steward testified that he was not properly informed about how he was
supposed to conduct the PDC Sweep and that he was told by another Sears employee
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named Howell to sweep the required lawn mower parts.  See Sorba v. Pa. Drilling Co.,
821 F.2d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 1987) (concluding that jury could find the proffered reason for
the termination unworthy of belief if plaintiff, who was allegedly terminated because his
supervisors were dissatisfied with his work on his last three jobs, could present evidence
that his supervisors realized that the poor results were not his fault).  Carter also testified
that there is always a backlog of mowers in the facility around the spring lawn and garden
season.  App. 1275 (“That [2001] was probably about the worst one [backlog], but, I
mean, it always - we get lawn mower season and we get maybe two, three law mowers
one day, you get 70 the next day.  Everybody is bringing them in, especially on the nice
day, and normally it’s towards the end of the week on Fridays and Saturdays.  You come
in on Monday morning and you can’t even open the door because lawn mowers are there
and that’s normally on Mondays....”). 
c.  Failure to respond to customer complaints
Steward also presented evidence to cast doubt on Sears’ claim that Steward was
terminated because he failed to respond to customer complaints.  In the various PPIs,
Schweizer listed several customers that Steward had not properly handled, namely,
customers Montana, Stagg, Givens, Rodel and Gaglia.  However, Steward presented
evidence that these customers were ultimately satisfied and that he had received praise
from several customers and had received a rating of “3” for customer service in 2001. 
Steward also noted that the five identified customers with complaints were only a handful
out of the 17,000 customers that his technicians serviced in 2001.  Carter testified that
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“we all had been in situations like” Steward’s.  App. 1273 (“I think we all had been in
situations like that [being criticized for handling of customer complaints], because once it
gets to the [District Service Manager] there’s time where they say that you didn’t handle
it, but it’s always, if you really look at it, it’s always a breakdown somewhere where a
call-taker might not have got all the information that you needed to take care of that
problem.”).  Carter’s general impression of Steward’s interaction with customers was that
“he did a great job with customers, if I had to say so myself, I think he did a great job
with them.”  App. 1299.  Steward also pointed out the lack of documentary evidence to
support Sears’ contention that Steward was not returning customer calls. 
d. Failure to be properly involved in “multiple repair attempts”
Steward also presented evidence to cast doubt on Sears’ claim that it terminated
Steward because he was not properly involved in “multiple repair attempts.”  In the initial
PPI, Schweizer informed Steward that he expected Steward to be more involved when a
technician returned to the same customer’s home multiple times in order to perform the
required service.  However, Steward testified that it was not true that he was not
providing input to his technicians on multiple repair attempts.  He testified that he “used
to routinely check multiple attempts to see what was going on” and that he “would
monitor the multiple attempts to see why, what was the cause of it, if it was a routing
issue, if it was a parts issue, if it was a tool issue.”  App. 469-70.  He stated that he
provided feedback to his technicians “all the time.”  App. 470.  Carter agreed that
Steward was “an excellent motivator” and that the technicians felt that Steward cared
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about them.  App. 1298.  Steward testified that he was not shown any documentation,
such as a multiple attempt report, that supported Schweizer’s contention that Steward was
not actively involved in multiple repair attempts.  App. 463.
3.  Sufficiency of the Steward’s Evidence
Sears contends that, even if we conclude that Steward established a prima facie
case of age discrimination and presented sufficient evidence to rebut Sears’ stated reasons
for terminating Steward, we should nonetheless affirm the order granting judgment as a
matter of law on the ground that Steward’s weak prima facie case plus the weak evidence
casting doubt on Sears’ stated reasons for the termination is insufficient to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Sears terminated Steward based on his age.  See
Alvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17, 25-26 (1st Cir.
1998).  We disagree.  Based on the record before them, the members of the jury could
have concluded that it was more likely than not that Sears terminated Steward based on
his age.  See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (“The factfinder's
disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is
accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima
facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”).  We will therefore reverse the
District Court’s order granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Sears.
B.  Motion for a New Trial
After granting Sears’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, the District Court
also granted Sears’ motion for a new trial.  We may affirm a district court’s grant of a
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new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence,
even if we reverse the order granting judgment as matter of law to the non-prevailing
party.  See Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 737 (3d Cir. 1988) (reversing order
granting judgment as a matter of law, but affirming order granting a new trial). 
“Deferential review is appropriate when considering whether a verdict is against the
weight of the evidence because the district court was able to observe the witnesses and
follow the trial in a way that we cannot replicate by reviewing a cold record.”  Greenleaf
v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). 
However, “[n]ew trials because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence are
proper only when the record shows that the jury’s verdict resulted in a miscarriage of
justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our
conscience.”  Id.  
Although our review of the District Court’s order is deferential, we conclude that
the District Court erred in granting Sears’ motion for a new trial.  The District Court’s
decision to grant the motion for a new trial was based on the same perceived deficiencies
in Steward’s case that caused the Court to grant Sears’ motion for judgment as a matter of
law.  As we have explained, we disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that the
evidence presented by Steward was insufficient to allow a jury to return a verdict in his
favor.  Because we do not believe that the evidence in favor of Sears was so
overwhelming that the verdict in favor of Steward shocks the conscience, we conclude
that the District Court’s grant of Sears’ motion for a new trial was an abuse of discretion. 
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We will therefore reverse the District Court’s order granting Sears’ motion for a new trial. 
III.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, we will reverse the District Court’s order
granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Sears and, in the alternative, granting
Sears’ motion for a new trial.
